- Posts by Daniel SchleifsteinPartner
Dan is a Partner with PIB Law, and focuses his practice on the representation of financial institutions in connection with financial services-related litigation matters and labor and employment matters.
Prior to joining PIB Law ...
On March 27, 2019, in a case handled by PIB, New Jersey’s Appellate Division affirmed a trial court decision denying the defendant’s eleventh-hour motion to vacate a sheriff’s sale and restrain delivery of the deed to a third-party purchaser predicated on a novel – but incorrect – theory that a reinstatement quote constituted a binding contract. The decision is significant because, had Defendant’s argument been successful, it could have created the threat of potential litigation based solely upon routine communications between servicers and borrowers.
A New York State Supreme Court issued a Decision and Order finding that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) was entitled to a judgment of foreclosure on a residential property finding that the bank had standing to proceed against a borrower who had been on default on a mortgage for ten years. (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Futterman, et al. Index No. 6384/2009 (Sup. Ct., Columbia Cty)). In this action, the borrower contended that the Court should deny the foreclosure action because the bank was purportedly not the true owner of the note. The Court found that the bank had standing to proceed both under the 2008 Purchase and Assumption Agreement between Washington Mutual and Chase and that Chase had made a sufficient showing that it possessed the original note. Defendant moved to vacate the Decision and Order on the grounds of “newly discovered evidence” under CPLR 5015. Specifically, the borrower argued that the key codes found in the loan’s history indicated that the loan was owned by Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corporation, which she argued was an independent subsidiary of Washington Mutual that was not acquired by Chase under the Purchase and Assumption Agreement.